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Introduction 
 
In October 2008, all seven justices of the High Court of Australia will hear an appeal 
against the Full Federal Court’s ruling that Ice TV infringed the Nine Network’s 
copyright in Nine’s weekly (television) program schedule (a compilation) by 
reproducing a substantial part of the schedule in Ice TV’s electronic program guide.
1
 
 
The convening of all seven judges of the High Court is a rare occasion and reserved 
for cases of special significance. The court’s decision in this case has the very real 
potential to influence the shape of innovation and productivity in Australia over the 
next decade.  It will be asked to determine a legal issue that invites the court to 
provide guidance on the underlying purpose of copyright law and its role in promoting 
information dissemination and information flows: variables that (evolutionary) 
economists see as foundational to innovation.
2
  
 
To this end we believe the outcome of this case may substantially determine the 
extent to which commercial information compilers control the use of non-expressive 
compilations. The underlying concern of many observers is that if substantial 
reproduction is said to result from appropriation of investment, and investment is said 
to be a legitimate simulacrum of expressive originality, most unauthorised copying of 
compiled information will constitute breach of copyright.  The adverse social and 
economic consequences of so-called ‘copyright in information’ may be great. 
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2
  See generally: JA Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943) Routledge London.  
See also JS Metcalf, The Broken Thread: Marshall, Schumpeter and Hayek on the Evolution of 
Capitalism, Ch 6 in Shinoya Y (Ed) Marshall and Schumpeter on Evolution, Economic Sociology of 
Capitalist Development, Edward Elgar, 2009, in which he discusses the idea that ‘economy evolves 
because knowledge evolves’ (p132).  “[C]ulture, knowledge, choices and social networks outside of the 
economy – [need] to be taken into account, for it transpires that this is where growth innovation and 
dynamism originates in the evolution not only of the economy but also of knowledge”: J Hartley (2009) 
‘From the Consciousness Industry to Creative Industries: Consumer-created content, social network 
markets and the growth of knowledge’ in Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren (eds) Media Industries: 
History, Theory and Methods. Oxford: Blackwell, 231-44. 
Copyright law protects compilations of information.
3
  In economic theory, 
compilation copyright safeguards information producers from rival producers who 
appropriate the information product – thus (in theory) the copyright simultaneously 
supplies productive incentive and encourages competition.  The result is optimum 
dissemination. 
In our opinion, the Full Federal Court, in considering the first appeal described the 
law on compilation copyright correctly.  The Court’s error stemmed from its failure, 
when considering ‘the interest protected by copyright’
4
, to apprehend the purpose for 
which the interest is protected.  Interest protected and purpose of protection are not 
identical subjects.  They are, however, logically related.  Unless the law is devoid of 
reason, an interest is protected for a purpose.  Determining substantial reproduction by 
reference to potential harm to the Nine Network’s commercial interest in 
programming information, the Court erroneously conflated the welfare of the Nine 
Network with the purpose for which copyright subsists in television guides. 
 
If the purpose of copyright subsistence is not discerned correctly, and instead is 
identified with protecting the copyright owner from competition, the result, as we 
discuss in this article, is that the legitimate flow of information, consistent with 
copyright principles, is constricted.  The Federal Court, we believe, became lost in the 
fog of law.
5
  If harm to the copyright owner’s interest is the determinant of 
infringement, copyright becomes an instrument of oppression, since it enables the 
owner to elide legitimate competition, to public detriment.  The Court, befogged by 
precedent, failed to realise that harm may be done to the copyright holder without 
causing injury to the copyright.
6
 
 
The way out of the fog is to respond fully to the question only partly considered by 
the Court - why (or for what purpose) does copyright subsist in the weekly schedules 
– and to apply the logic of the answer to resolving the question of infringement.  As 
we explain, our assumption, consistent with conventional public policy precepts 
adopted in Australia in the last 25 years, is that regulation is justified to the extent that 
it achieves agreed social goals and does not hinder competition.  A court is not asked 
to predicate each judgment on fine analysis of social utility or competitive effect. But 
if a legal inquiry raises questions of regulatory purpose, the questions should not be 
avoided and cannot be answered by resort to legal doctrine alone. 
                                                 
3
 A compilation is literary work and protects original literary works.  To attract copyright protection a 
compilation must be original: Nine v Ice [9]-[10]. 
4
 Nationwide News v Copyright Agency Limited (1996) 65 FCR 399, 418 provided that substantiality is 
defined ‘with reference to the interest protected by copyright.’ 
5
 Cf Carl von Clausewitz, originator of the phrase ‘fog of war’ in On War Bk 2 Ch 2 par 24: ‘The great 
uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be 
planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently — like the effect of a fog or moonshine 
— gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance.’ 
6
 Cf Lyman Ray Patterson ‘Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use’ 1989 Vanderbilt Law Review 40 1-66 
(and see also Copyright in Historical Perspective Vanderbilt University Press 1968).  Patterson 
distinguished between the limited function of copyright – to restrain piracy – and the licence implied by 
the US Constitution to use copyright works in ways that did not constitute piracy.  ‘… copyright has 
both a purpose and function.  The purpose is to promote learning; the function is to protect the author’s 
economic interest.  The function, however, must serve the purpose, not vice versa.  To say that the 
copyright owner has a right to the profit and a right to deny public access is to fly in the face of the 
constitutional scheme of copyright.  The purpose of copyright relates to the use of the work; the 
function of copyright relates to the use of the copyright.  In order to protect the author against the use 
of the copyright, it is not necessary to deny the consumer the use of the work.’ (At 46).    
 In neo-classical economic language, regulation creates distinct sovereignties: those of 
producer or consumer (including user).
7
  Consumer sovereignty, achieved in theory by 
the elimination of market failure, is accepted, in Australia as elsewhere, as the goal of 
regulatory policy and the measure of regulatory efficiency.
8
  If the producer is the 
market sovereign, the result is inefficiency and market failure.  We argue below, that 
as a matter of public policy, it cannot be that, without more, copyright subsists in the 
weekly schedules in order to protect the Nine Network against appropriation in all 
circumstances.  The goal of consumer sovereignty necessitates that copyright protects 
Nine against unauthorised copying in order that Nine continues to disseminate 
information by competing in the relevant market.  
 
The novelty of our approach is to separate copyright holder and copyright, and show 
that, for reasons of public policy, copyright may subsist for a purpose different from 
the purpose the holder wishes to assert.  By analysing subsistence and infringement by 
reference to public policy,
9
 we supply a method of analysis that is consistent with both 
doctrine and policy.  Our approach has some similarity to that of some courts and 
commentators in the United States, and the European Union legislature (see Part B 
under ‘Constitutional and Purpose Considerations’), which have located analysis of 
copyright scope in the context of constitutional considerations (the US) and declared 
purposes (the EU).
10
   
 
Our aim then is to clarify and examine the logic of the Full Court’s decision.  In Part 
A, we identify logical propositions underlying the court’s reasoning, then articulate 
and discuss the legal policy implicit in that reasoning.  In Part B, we discuss further 
policy considerations raised in Part A. 
 
                                                 
7
 Neo-classicists did not actually coin the term.  William Hutt invented the phrase ‘consumer 
sovereignty’ and Ludwig von Mises developed the concept.  John Kenneth Galbraith popularised the 
notion of producer sovereignty arising as the result of subversion of the market by producers, through 
marketing and other means, directing the preferences of consumers.  Neo-classical economists 
(including those of the Chicago School) agree, however, that consumer sovereignty is the goal of 
market economics, though they see its realisation as an ideal because of the difficulty in removing anti-
competitive distortions from the market.  Von Mises and Hayek considered removal of distortions 
possible if government took appropriate action.  They, together with some members of the Chicago 
School, took the view that consumer sovereignty may be realisable.  But neo-classicists (including the 
Chicago School) and the Austrian School all agree that market distortions created by the collusions and 
restrictive practices of producers and governments shrink the choices available to consumers.  The goal 
of governments ought to be the removal of such distortions, and the correction of market failure – 
induced by, for example, laws encouraging monopoly – to allow consumer sovereignty to become a 
reality.  Public policy in the Western world universally accepts the goal of achieving consumer 
sovereignty as an object of regulatory policy.   
8
 See, eg, references below to National Competition Policy. 
9
 The Federal Court did not analyse the purpose of subsistence or the reason why the Nine Network’s 
copyright interest required protection.  It assumed that copyright conferred on Nine a right to protection 
against appropriation of relevant information in the weekly schedules.  
10
Directive 96/9/EC (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases) contains a preamble of 60 articles, many of which concern the need, by 
harmonisation of database laws, to foster competition and the free flow of goods and services in the 
EC.  
  
PART A – FULL FEDERAL COURT’S JUDGMENT 
 
Logic of Full Federal Court’s judgment 
In our view, the Court asserted, implicitly or explicitly, three major logical 
propositions. 
 
PROPOSITION 1 
 
Copyright subsists in the weekly schedules to protect the Nine Network’s position in a 
competitive market. 
 
What the Full Federal Court said:
11
  
 
[102] … Contrary to Her Honour’s implicit finding, Nine and Ice were 
competitors in the sense that each was seeking to derive profit from the 
dissemination of the time and title information 
[104] Viewed more broadly, the creation by Nine of a compilation based on its 
programming (time and title) decisions, was a central element of its business 
as a television broadcaster for the reason that the compilation was an essential 
step in informing its potential viewing public of what it had on offer. Within 
the competitive environment of television broadcasting it can be assumed that 
Nine had no business option but to create the compilation. 
[113] Ice appropriated many pieces of the time and title information, 
apparently on a weekly basis. It did so in order to create something 
commercially valuable out of templates that otherwise would have had no 
commercial value to it.  
 
Policy 
 
Subsistence was not in issue in the case before the Full Court, but its discussion of 
substantiality focused on Ice’s alleged appropriation of the results of the Nine 
Network’s investment, and discussion of the policy for compilation copyright.  
Questions of appropriation are inevitably tied to considerations of subsistence policy 
because appropriation is a purposive act: the act of reproducing compiled information 
constitutes substantial reproduction if the purpose of the act conflicts with the purpose 
for which copyright subsists in the compilation.
12
 
 
Although it emphasised the Nine Network’s expenditure of skill and labour, the 
Federal Court did not explain the policy for protecting the results of that investment.  
But its reasoning, from paragraph [72] onwards makes evident that, in the court’s 
opinion, the originality of the time and titles compilations derived from the 
commercial value of those compilations.  Paragraphs [102] [104] and [113] (excerpts 
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 Nine Network Australia Pty Limited v IceTV Pty Limited [2008] FCAFC 71 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2008/71.html 
12
 See [94] of the Federal Court judgment: ‘These principles strongly suggest that, although the 
quantity of any material copied by Ice from the Weekly Schedules (directly or indirectly) is relevant to 
the issue of substantiality, it is more important to take into account the originality of the material that 
has been copied …’ 
above) suggest that, in the court’s opinion, the policy at large for compilation 
copyright lies in protecting the investor from commercial injury.  
 
Critique 
 
The question of substantial reproduction cannot be decided without defining the 
purpose of the alleged reproduction and the purpose for which copyright subsists in 
the subject matter reproduced.  The Federal Court explained its approach to the 
question of substantiality more loosely: ‘The quality of what is taken must be assessed 
by reference to the interest protected by the copyright.’
13
  The court assumed the 
copyright interest to be indivisible from the interest asserted by the copyright holder.  
However, copyright and copyright holder are distinct: the copyright holder does not 
determine the scope of the copyright.   
 
The court explained that the Nine Network invested labour and skill to produce the 
time and title compilations, and that Ice’s putative reproduction of information in the 
compilations could damage the Nine Network’s competitive position.
14
   It can be 
assumed by inference that the court assumed that copyright inhered in the time and 
title compilations to protect the Nine Network’s position in a competitive market.  But 
the judgment did not give any reasons that adequately support such an assumption.  
Nothing in the court’s reasoning explains explicitly the purpose for which copyright 
subsists in the Nine Network’s compilations or why copyright should protect Nine’s 
competitive position. 
 
The court, as far as can be ascertained, considered that copyright in the weekly 
schedules subsists to protect the Nine Network from a competitor taking, without 
warrant, the fruits of its investment.
15
  While the court asserted that the parties were 
competitors in the supply of programming information, and that competitive necessity 
compelled the Nine Network to produce the weekly schedules, the judgment did not 
define the market in which the parties supposedly competed, or the competitive 
intentions of Ice, or the harm that might be caused to Nine by Ice’s alleged copying.      
 
Having imputed to the weekly schedules a commercial purpose, and declared Ice and 
the Nine Network to be competitors – presumably in the supply of programming 
information – the court neglected to explore the fundamental questions that pertained 
to whether Ice’s actions could or would cause competitive harm to the Nine Network. 
The absence from the judgment of market analysis undermines the credibility of the 
court’s conclusions.   
 
From a public policy perspective, copyright cannot subsist to protect the Nine 
Network.  Its purpose is to prevent free-riding that, by making supply of the weekly 
schedules uneconomic, could drive Nine from the market, leading to consumer 
welfare deficit.  Yet the Federal Court’s judgment in no respect showed that the 
alleged copying by Ice involved appropriation intended, or likely, to cause market 
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 At [93] (per Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Copyright Agency Limited (1996) 65 FCR 399). 
14
 As noted, see the discussion, beginning at [72] of the impact of the alleged copying., esp [102]-[104].   
15
 Eg at [116]: ‘As we have explained, the existence of Strip Programs does not negate the fact that 
Nine expended substantial skill and labour in compiling the Weekly Schedules. Nor does it detract 
from the conclusion that Ice, by reproducing time and title information via the Aggregator Guides, took 
the fruits of Nine’s skill and labour.’ 
harm to the Nine Network, or likely to cause reduction or cessation of Nine’s 
production of programming information.
16
 
 
As discussed, public policy suggests that the fact of substantial reproduction be 
determined by reference to the purpose of subsistence.  If purpose is tied to the object 
of protecting investment from free-riding (to secure optimum dissemination), it can be 
seen that substantial reproduction occurs when a market exists for the supply of goods 
or services, and A’s appropriation of the product of B’s investment: 
• is intended to secure competitive advantage in the market 
• may cause market harm to B 
• may cause B to reduce supply or leave the market. 
 
The purpose of compilation copyright, according to this analysis, is to secure 
continued production and supply, for the benefit of the public.  Market analysis, 
applied to the facts of the case, would make unlikely a finding of infringement by Ice.  
Market analysis is proposed for two reasons.  First, public policy locates the conduct 
of corporate entities within the boundaries of markets.  It is not possible to analyse the 
conduct of companies outside the relevant market.  Whether or not Ice has acted as a 
free-rider must be determined by reference to a market.  Second, the Full Court’s 
judgment invites market analysis.  The court declared the parties to be competitors 
and observed that ‘within the competitive environment of television broadcasting’ 
Nine ‘had no business option but to create’ the weekly schedules (at [104]).  Clearly, 
their Honours understood the putative harm caused by Ice’s appropriation to 
competitive harm, in other words, harm caused by Ice to Nine in a market.  
 
PROPOSITION 2 
 
A person who appropriates the results of skill and labour without the copyright 
owner’s consent, infringes the copyright. 
 
What the Full Federal Court said:
17
 
 
[111]  The time and title information incorporated into the Weekly Schedules 
reflected a great deal of skill and labour on the part of Mr Healy and 
Ms Wieland. As we have explained, Ice, to the extent it reproduced time and 
title information from the Weekly Schedules, appropriated the skill and labour 
used by Nine to create the Weekly Schedules. 
 
[112] … That information [time and title data], which Ice either obtained from 
or checked against the updated Aggregated Guides (which in turn incorporated 
time and title information provided by Nine), was essential to Ice’s project. 
Without it, IceGuide would have been commercially useless. 
 
[115] When the quality of the material taken by Ice is considered, the 
substantiality of the part taken becomes even clearer. Ice took, via the 
                                                 
16
 The High Court has rejected a tort of unfair competition: Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris 
Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 414.  Conduct alleged to be unfair competition must be restrained by a known 
cause of action.   
17
 Nine Network Australia Pty Limited v IceTV Pty Limited [2008] FCAFC 71  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2008/71.html 
Aggregated Guides, precisely the pieces of information that reflected the 
exercise of skill and labour by Nine in determining the program for a 
particular day or other period. 
 
Policy 
 
As noted earlier, the Full Federal Court explained ad hoc the policy for compilation 
copyright by reference to competition, its judgment suggesting that copyright 
subsisted in the Nine Networks weekly schedules to protect Nine’s competitive 
interest in the supply of programming information. The originality in the time and 
titles compilations derived from the labour and skill invested in their production, and 
that labour and skill was directed towards a commercial purpose (see [104] of the 
judgment).  In the case of the Nine Network, copyright protected the commercially 
valuable results of labour and skill. 
 
If this summary is correct, the court’s single rationale for finding substantial 
reproduction by Ice is that reproduction of time and title information could harm the 
Nine Network’s competitive position as a supplier of programming information.  It 
cannot be proposed as policy that reproduction of the information in a compilation 
infringes copyright simply because the compilation is the result of skill and effort.  
Policy cannot support copyright in the investment of skill and effort in themselves.  
Legal policy does not operate in a vacuum.  This much is implicitly recognised in 
those parts of the court’s judgment that discuss the commercial value of the time and 
title compilations to the Nine Network and Ice. 
 
Critique 
 
The court did not directly articulate policy for compilation copyright.  However, its 
reasoning draws implicitly, in a mixed and incomplete way, on two philosophical 
rationales for copyright subsistence in compilations.  Each bears upon determination 
of substantial reproduction. 
 
The first rationale posits that copyright protection is the Nine Network’s just desert.
18
  
Arguing from models of either corrective or distributive justice, proponents of desert 
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 The Full Federal Court did not make this point explicitly but its reasoning, similar to that of the 
authority it quoted, rested in part on the premise that the simple fact of investment or compilation by 
‘sweat of the brow’ invites protection.  See its discussion of Desktop Marketing Systems v Telstra 
Corporation Limited [2002] FCAFC 112 at [90]: ‘The Court concluded that, as a matter of authority 
and policy, the concept of originality in copyright should be understood as embracing a compilation 
that is the product of substantial labour and expense, provided it is not merely copied from other 
works’. 
Advocates of intellectual property typically justify rights by arguing axiomatically from John Locke’s 
labour-desert theory of property.  Their axiom is that property is a legitimate reward for labour.  Locke 
said: ‘[e]very man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself.  The 
labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.  Whatsoever, then, he 
removes out of the state that nature has provided, and left it in, he has mixed his labour with, and joined 
it to something that his own, and thereby makes it his property.  It being by him removed from the 
common state nature hath place it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the 
common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man 
but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at leastwhere there is enough, and as good, left in 
common for others.’ (John Locke, Two Treatises of Government – Treatise Two, Chapter 5, Section 
27). 
theory make the case for protection on the basis that those who sow deserve to reap 
(corrective justice), or that those who expend labour are entitled to possess what they 
produce (distributive justice).
19
   
 
The second rationale asserts that, in specific circumstances, copyright protection 
supplies incentive.  If, in these circumstances, the Nine Network, or others, cannot 
rely on proprietary rights to protect their investment in the production of information, 
they will cease production, leading to undersupply of information products.
20
 
 
We consider that only the incentive rationale – if necessary conditions are met - 
provides an appropriate justification for copyright subsistence in the present case.  
More relevantly, since subsistence is not at issue, we consider, as discussed below, 
that a finding of substantial reproduction by Ice is only reconcilable with public policy 
if the facts show that Ice’s conduct may cause Nine to cease supplying programming 
information, or restrict supply of that information.  
 
Justification from desert 
 
Why do those who sow deserve to reap? And why does labour and skill (investment) 
entitle the investor to property in the thing produced? From the perspective of public 
policy, informed by allocative welfare economics, the answer is that labour or 
investment, in themselves, supply no entitlement.   
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 Stewart E Sterk, ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’, 94 Michigan Law Review, 1995-1996, 
1197-1249.  Sterk identifies the inadequacies of both the corrective and distributive justice claims for 
copyright protection.  The corrective justice model posits that copyright regulation corrects real or 
potential injustices to authors or producers.  It asserts that copyright holders are entitled to legal 
protection because of the utility of their labour.  Without protection, they may withhold labour, and no 
one is affirmatively entitled to benefit from their labour.  A third proposition is that copyright owners 
are entitled to rely on the legal system to claim remuneration for labour.  Sterk points out that this 
mishmash of propositions says nothing about the justification for copyright.  The distributive justice 
model, by contrast, implies that the copyright system distributes the rewards of property to the 
industrious.  It relies principally on Locke’s labour theory to assert, in Locke’s words, that ‘God gave 
the World … to the use of the Industrious and Rational, and Labour was to be his Title to it’.  Sterk 
points out the intuitive appeal of the idea that labour is rewarded with property.  The economic 
consequences of encouraging people to work more to own more are greater production and more 
wealth.  Seen in this light the distributionist model posits incentive as a consequence of copyright 
protection.  Sterk casts doubt on the idea that copyright protection is necessary to create incentive.  A 
more relevant question, in the present context, is whether the argument that property rights result in 
productive incentive is sufficient in itself to justify copyright protection.  Our argument is that incentive 
is meaningless unless related to purpose – ie, what is the purpose of encouraging production?  
20
 The Full Federal Court made indirect reference to the purpose of protecting the Nine Network’s 
investment in its discussion of competition between Ice and Nine. The Court implied that Ice’s 
reproduction of time and titles information injured Nine because it gave Ice a competitive advantage: 
see [78] [102] and [104].  At [102]: ‘Nine and Ice were competitors in the sense that each was seeking 
to derive profit from the dissemination of the time and title information.’ At [104]: ‘Viewed more 
broadly, the creation by Nine of a compilation based on its programming (time and title) decisions, was 
a central element of its business as a television broadcaster for the reason that the compilation was an 
essential step in informing its potential viewing public of what it had on offer. Within the competitive 
environment of television broadcasting it can be assumed that Nine had no business option but to create 
the compilation. However attractive its programs and their scheduling might be, they would be of very 
limited value if viewers had no programme guide and had to chance upon the programs that they 
wanted to see.’ 
The case for regulatory intervention to protect investment depends on the social utility 
of the investment, because the object of regulation is to optimise public welfare.
21
   In 
public policy terms, property in information is justified only as a solution to market 
failure caused by piracy driving the information producer from the market.  If the 
information producer is deterred from production by pirates or free-riders, then 
property rights may supply an incentive to continue production, thus ensuring the 
continuing dissemination of information to the public – the goal of regulatory 
intervention (see discussion below on incentive theory). 
 
In can be seen that in public policy terms, the welfare of the Nine Network is relevant 
to the regulator to the extent that legal protection prevents market failure by ensuring 
dissemination.  The desert of the Nine Network, the scale of its investment, the 
amount of labour or skill it has expended, the fact that it has sown and expects to reap, 
each of these considerations is relevant to the regulator only to the extent that they 
cause the Nine Network to decide it cannot continue to participate in the market for 
supplying programming information.  Considered in detachment from the market, 
which functions to deliver information to the public, none of these considerations – 
from the public policy perspective - entitles the Nine Network to proprietary rights. 
 
Arguments founded on concepts of corrective or distributive justice usually emphasise 
the author’s unique contribution but originality need not be their cornerstone.  Desert 
theory is an accommodating doctrine which justifies protection for just about any 
human product.  Output thus matters more than the nature of input.  If you produce 
something you deserve to own it.
22
 
 
Explained in this way, desert theory fails because it asserts rather than justifies.  
Claims for monopoly rights because they are deserved in no way supply a policy for 
copyright regulation.  Policy is determined by articulating social objectives.  For what 
purpose is regulation needed?
23
  In the case of compilation copyright, it might be 
argued that justification is beside the point.  Since information is an infinite resource, 
the possible negative consequences of copyright in information can only be negligible 
                                                 
21
 The guarantor of regulation’s efficiency in achieving agreed objectives is competition policy.  
National Competition Policy states that regulation must not restrict competition unless regulatory 
authorities can show that a. the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the 
costs and b. the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition (see the 
National Competition Council’s Compendium of National Competition Policy Agreements, 2
nd
 edition, 
consisting of the Competition Principles Agreement, Conduct Code Agreement and Agreement to 
Implement the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms). 
22
 Numerous commentators have argued that Locke did not intend his labour-desert theory to apply to 
intangibles.  He considered the Stationers’ Company’s monopoly on printing an ‘invasion of the trade, 
liberty, and property of the subject.’  See Tom W Bell Intellectual Privilege: Copyright, Common Law 
and the Common Good, Tom G Palmer, forthcoming book (www.intellectualprivilege.com), ‘Are 
Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?’ 13 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (1990) 817, 
Richard Epstein, ‘Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law’ 42 San Diego 
Law Review (2005) 1,20, Ronan Deazley, Rethinking Copyright, Edward Elgar (2008). 
23
 This question exposes the speciousness of entitlement arguments.  What purpose is served by 
granting monopoly rights in the output? This question must be asked, and answered satisfactorily, 
before protection can be said to be justified.  If the proposed purpose of awarding rights is private 
reward and that reward is not linked to public benefit the purpose is not sufficient to justify protection.  
Reward of producers is not (in itself) a valid justification for policy. 
in effect.  But even an argument of this generality can be rebutted, on the grounds that 
privatising information is a step towards privatising infinity.
24
 
 
Justification from incentive 
 
Incentive theory posits that proprietary rights prevent undersupply by protecting 
producers from economic attack by free-riders.  Protected against appropriation of 
investment output, producers retain the incentive to continue production and to 
increase output to satisfy demand.  Proprietary rights protect against the flight of 
investment. 
 
Incentive theory, however, also assumes a competitive market and consumer 
sovereignty.  Thus proprietary rights supply incentive to continue competitive 
production – for the purpose of increasing consumer welfare.  The welfare of 
consumers – not producers - is the object of awarding rights.  The Full Court 
mistakenly assumed the reverse, making the welfare of a particular producer, in this 
case, the Nine Network, the object of legal intervention.  However, incentive theory 
supports copyright in the weekly schedules only to the extent that copyright 
guarantees continued production that the Nine Network would otherwise withdraw or 
reduce.   
 
If the Nine Network’s copyright in the weekly schedules is justified as an incentive to 
continued production, determination of the question of substantial reproduction must 
consider whether Ice’s alleged appropriation threatens Nine’s production.  This 
determination would involve analysis of competitive effect by consideration of 
questions such as: 
• what is the market? 
• are the Nine Network and Ice competitors in the market? 
• what is the purpose of the alleged appropriation? 
• does the alleged appropriation cause under-supply of information? 
 
 
PROPOSITION 3 
 
Indirect reproduction of a copyright compilation infringes the copyright if the 
reproduction uses a substantial amount of information disclosed by the compilation. 
 
What the Full Federal Court said:
25
 
 
[124] The test of whether the necessary causal relationship exists between a 
copyright work and an infringing work is whether the infringing work was 
produced by use of the copyright work: [cit] That test ordinarily involves 
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assessing whether the alleged infringer has produced a result substantially 
similar to the copyright work by independent skill or labour, without copying 
[cit]. All that is required is ‘some causal connection’ [cit]. 
[128] It is correct, as Ice submits and her Honour found, that the Aggregated 
Guides as a whole were significantly different in look, feel and content to the 
Weekly Schedules. Nonetheless, the Aggregated Guides reproduced, with 
permission, the totality of Nine’s time and title information. If it matters, the 
form of the reproduction of that information bore significant similarities to that 
used by Nine. Ice used the time and title information reproduced in the 
Aggregated Guides as an important resource for producing IceGuide. In 
consequence Ice reproduced a substantial part of Nine’s copyright work. The 
required causal connection was present. This was a case of indirect copying of 
a substantial part of a copyright work. 
Policy  
 
In finding that Ice’s indirect reproduction amounted to substantial reproduction, the 
court appeared to focus on the purpose and effect of reproduction.  Ice wished to 
reproduce Nine’s programming information in its own program guide, and the effect, 
in the Full Federal Court’s view, was likely to be detrimental to the Nine Network.  
That Ice obtained the information from a source independent of the Nine Network – 
the aggregated guides – did not alter the fact of appropriation potentially harmful to 
Nine.   
 
The Full Court therefore seemed to reaffirm its belief that the policy of compilation 
copyright is to protect the compiler, but its judgment is indefinite about why 
protection is afforded.  Faced with lacunae in the judgment concerning the nature of 
harm or the reason for protection, the reader is forced to search for rationales.  The 
court seemed to accept implicitly that appropriation, because it offended Nine, 
constituted infringement.  In the absence of evidence to show harm, an advocate 
would be hard pressed to show why mere appropriation is substantial reproduction.  
The court's reasoning suggests a view that infringement occurs if indirect copying 
might lead to unspecified disadvantage to the compiler.     
 
Critique 
 
In its discussion of indirect reproduction, the court, as elsewhere in the judgment, 
failed to explain the logic of its reasoning.  If Ice, by indirect copying, appropriates 
Nine’s information product, why does the indirect copying of itself constitute 
substantial reproduction? The court did not say.  The court explained, by reference to 
authority, the mechanics or protection and infringement, but did not explain why the 
law protects compilations.   
 
It is clear, however, that questions of subsistence and infringement are related.  It 
seems obvious from its reasoning that court did not consider that the mere fact of Ice 
reproducing information in the aggregated schedules amounted to infringement.  The 
court evidently considered that Ice’s action would only amount to infringement if the 
copying could materially injure Nine’s interests.  But it did not say so explicitly, 
leaving the reader to deduce its logic.  However, that logic seems clear. Ice infringed 
because it appropriated, for a competitive purpose, information compiled for a 
competitive purpose.  Ice’s purpose, and the potential effect of its action on Nine, the 
owner of the compilation, were, for the Federal Court the fundamental considerations 
leading to its finding of infringement. 
 
This being so, the question arises – why? The answer reveals that the court has failed 
to reconcile policy with mechanics.  It has mechanistically followed authority to 
determine questions of substantial reproduction while failing to grasp the policy that 
makes its application of authority problematic.  An answer to the question posed 
earlier leads back to the earlier discussions of policy.  It would be contrary to policy to 
argue that copyright subsists in compilations merely to protect the interests of the 
compiler.   
 
Copyright would then be merely a device for restrictive trade practice.  Conventional 
economic theory requires that regulation increase public welfare.  Policy therefore 
demands that copyright subsist in compilations to ensure the continued dissemination 
of information for the public good.  Copyright is thus a device to provide the compiler 
with the necessary legal protection to continue production.  If this is so, the Federal 
Court’s discussion of indirect reproduction is primarily deficient because it failed to 
examine the harm intended and potentially caused by Ice’s indirect reproduction.  It 
failed to determine whether Ice, by its action, appropriated information from a 
competitor, and it failed to consider whether the appropriation was likely to cause 
harm to Nine that could cause it to cease production of information.  
 
 
 
PART B – POLICY CONSIDERATIONS   
 
Having highlighted the key issues arising from the Full Court’s judgment it is 
pertinent to further examine the policy considerations at play. 
 
Compilation copyright 
 
To restate the underlying premise: Copyright law protects compilations of 
information.  In theory, compilation copyright safeguards information producers from 
free-riders who appropriate the information product – thus (in theory) the copyright 
simultaneously supplies productive incentive and encourages competition.  The result 
is optimum dissemination. 
 
Purpose   
 
Although judges usually determine the subsistence of compilation copyright 
hermeneutically by reference to legal principle (eg, the expenditure of skill and effort 
in the compilation of information predicts originality), the economic rationale stated 
above supplies the logical justification for compilation copyright, and informs, to 
varying degrees, the logic of judgments.
26
  No other rationale for compilation 
copyright is, in public policy terms, tenable, a fact explicitly recognised in some 
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judgments and indirectly by US merger doctrine.
27
  We propose that judges 
determining the originality of a compilation, or whether substantial reproduction has 
occurred, should ensure that their findings are consistent with the purpose of 
compilation copyright.   Divorced from consideration of purpose, legal exegesis to 
discover originality or substantial reproduction is likely to result in findings that defy 
logic or commonsense. 
  
The same can be said about any common law exercise in determining the scope of 
copyrights.
28
  The difference is that while the rationale of compilation copyright is 
unequivocal the purpose of copyright law generally is much more difficult to adduce.  
Copyright law is not governed by ineluctable logic and policy discernible from the 
record is inconsistent.
 29
  The interpreter is forced to consider hypotheses about why 
copyright laws were made and discovers that theory about copyright’s function does 
not match reality.
30
 
 
The most constructive way to resolve these difficulties is to accept as a principle 
guiding interpretation that to the extent that policy consensus exists about the function 
of copyright, interpreters should interpret legislation to give effect to that policy.  For 
example, it is probably uncontroversial that a function of copyright law is to 
encourage information dissemination.
31
  Adopting the suggested approach, the object 
of dissemination is a relevant consideration in interpreting the scope of a right. 
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 In theory, dissemination is the primary purpose of copyright law but many copyright law advocates 
are willing to acknowledge only that it is one of many equal objects of the law.  
The greatest problem in adopting this suggestion lies in determining an agreed 
rationale for copyright law that could be used universally by judges interpreting the 
law.  As noted, the policy of copyright law, so far as the parliamentary and 
government record is concerned, is an incoherent jumble.  Judicial policy elucidation 
is mostly based on speculation and hypothesis drawn from academic writings and 
government reports.  Copyright policy is a moveable feast, and the most sane way to 
resolve conflicts and confusions is to eschew attempts to discover a historical policy, 
and instead rely on a clear statement of what the law should achieve.
32
  The 
judiciary’s responsibility for identifying and giving effect to the public purpose of 
copyright regulation can hardly be overstated.
33
 
 
Fulfilling the rationale of compilation copyright 
 
Compilation copyright cases turn on questions of subsistence (originality) and 
infringement (substantial reproduction) and though judges rarely elucidate the 
rationale for this category of copyright protection, their reasoning about the elements 
of originality and reproduction points to that rationale.  Protection for a compilation 
may be granted because the compilation involves skill and effort (Desktop) or refused 
because it manifests nil creative input (Feist).  In these cases, the courts  stipulated 
‘skill and effort’ and ‘creativity’ as conditions of subsistence because they considered 
that copyright law protects investment and creativity.  Why? The judges did not say.  
The answer lies in economic theory.  Protecting investment in compilations prevents 
free-riding, thus increasing dissemination.  Protecting creativity also prevents free-
riding, stimulating the creator (producer) to further production. 
 
If the rationale for compilation copyright is defeating free-riding to encourage 
dissemination, to what extent is this policy relevant to analysis in the Ice TV case?  
Primarily as a conceptual tool.  If copyright in the weekly schedules subsists because 
Nine invested skill and effort in their compilation, on what basis does Nine’s 
investment justify protection? The investment in skill and effort may be the 
determinant of subsistence, but it is not, of itself, the justification for protection.  
Justification comes from policy: investment deserves protection only if it prevents 
free-riding, thus encouraging further investment and dissemination of information.  
Thus, the fundamental policy question is whether, in compiling its program guide, Ice 
free-rides on Nine’s investment.  An answer to this question is obtained by 
ascertaining whether Nine and Ice compete in a market for the supply of program 
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guides and, if they do, whether Ice obtains an unfair competitive advantage over Nine 
through publication of its program guide. 
 
It can be seen that reference to policy – the theoretical rationale for compilation 
copyright – allows for clarification of the subjective elements involved in determining 
subsistence and substantiality.  Adopting policy-based analysis, deficiencies in the 
Full Federal Court’s analysis of the case become obvious.  The court found that 
Nine’s investment warranted protection, and that Ice’s program guide reproduced a 
substantial portion of the weekly schedules.  It failed to explain, however, why 
protection of Nine’s investment was of itself justified.  In other words, its conclusions 
applied legal principle but did not comprehend the policy that underlies principle.  
When the purpose of compilation copyright is considered, it becomes obvious that 
findings of subsistence or substantial reproduction should wait on determination, by 
reference to competition principles, of the question whether protection of investment 
will prevent free-riding and encourage dissemination.  If the answer is no, if the 
supply of program guides does not constitute a market, or if Ice TV does not use 
information about Nine’s programming to secure competitive advantage over Nine, 
any grounds for protecting Nine’s investment evaporate. 
 
Dissemination 
 
Compilations consist of information.  As discussed, the reason for allowing copyright 
in compilations of information, given the historical consensus that copyright protects 
expression and not ideas, and common law ambiguity over whether originality 
demands any element of creativity, is utilitarian.  The law protects investment against 
free-riders.  But why does it do so?  Cases such as Ice TV v Nine Network, like the 
recent High Court case of Copyright Agency Limited v State of NSW,
34
 encourage the 
Court to consider fundamental questions about the dissemination of information and 
the purpose of copyright law in encouraging dissemination. 
 
Dissemination is a social good, justifiable in economic, social and political theory.  It 
enables individuals in society to understand, learn and express.  The flow of 
information helps individuals to exercise their creative and productive faculties, to 
organise themselves, and to create and nurture the processes and institutions that 
produce material welfare and political freedom.  In short, information dissemination is 
fundamental to both individual and social growth.  The more a society disseminates 
information, the more critically informed its citizens become about the choices it 
offers, the more free they are to exercise choices about living – an observation that 
distils Sir Francis Bacon’s aphorism ‘knowledge is power’ (which could be 
paraphrased as ‘knowledge is freedom’).  If political, economic and social freedom 
are agreed to be socially desirable in themselves, as well as predictors of economic 
growth, then information dissemination is crucial to social welfare. 
 
Dissemination the goal of copyright policy 
 
This much is recognised in conventional economic analysis of regulation.  The Review 
of intellectual property under the Competition Principles Agreement’ (the Ergas 
Report) stated in 2000 that, ‘[b]alancing between providing incentives to invest in 
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innovation on one hand, and for efficient diffusion of innovation on the other, is a 
central, and perhaps the crucial, element in the design of intellectual property laws.’
35
    
 
Regulation’s function is social: the object of regulation in democratic society must be 
to fulfil agreed goals pertaining to that society.
36
  In the case of intellectual property 
regulation, the goal is dissemination.  An orthodox legal analysis might disagree with 
this assertion, but the validation of intellectual property laws is not the preserve of 
lawyers.
37
   
  
It can be seen that if regulation is interrogated for purpose consistent with social 
objectives, and the exercise uncovers laws without social utility, those laws are 
contrary to policy.  The moral and material self-justifications advanced by copyright 
owners tend to obscure this point.  To be valid, regulation must define social 
objectives, and, consistent with competition policy, establish the machinery to achieve 
them.  Desert arguments for copyright protection are justified only to the extent that 
they are consistent with social purposes.  Applying this premise to analysis of the 
corrective/distributive justice models, it can be seen that protecting output on the 
simple grounds that output deserves protection is offensive to public policy.  To 
postulate, however, that protection supplies incentive to further output suggests the 
beginning of a policy for regulation.  But the incentive theory raises another question: 
why is more output desirable?  The answer to this query supplies the only defensible 
policy rationale for copyright regulation, if regulatory policy is agreed to be a device 
to secure public welfare.  It is that output, and the incentive to produce more, results 
in the dissemination of information, which is a social good. 
 
All defensible rationales for copyright regulatory policy lead to one object: the 
dissemination of information to benefit society in the ways enumerated above.  If 
copyright law-making is not tied to purpose, if its overriding hypothesis is that private 
interests deserve protection, then copyright laws undermine rather than enhance 
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consumer sovereignty.  Producer sovereignty results in restricted access and 
inefficient pricing,
38
 and discourages competitive innovation. 
 
Intellectual infrastructure 
 
Recent scholarship in the United States has characterised the aggregate of what might 
be described as useful data in the public domain as an ‘intellectual infrastructure’.
39
  
The use of a noun that suggests an enabling system is deliberate: the intellectual 
infrastructure is not a purposeless, disconnected mass of information swirling at large 
in a fathomless galaxy of scientific, technical and literary output.  Rather it is a useful 
and accessible body of knowledge that grows or shrinks depending on the principles 
adopted by intellectual property regulators.  
 
Merger doctrine accommodates the central idea of scholars writing about the 
intellectual infrastructure, which is that innovation, and human progress via the 
application of knowledge, increase if laws nurture the infrastructure of knowledge by 
enabling people to contribute to, and freely draw from, that infrastructure.  The idea 
that copyright cannot subsist if idea and expression are inseparable forces the 
regulator to face squarely the question of copyright’s purpose.  Is it to protect the 
production of information (in the present case by the Nine Network’s compilation of 
program information) or to facilitate the dissemination of information? 
 
The concept of an intellectual infrastructure shows that the way in which regulators 
answer the question will significantly influence the welfare of both country and 
citizens.  Just as the physical infrastructure degrades in the absence of renewal, and 
expands after the application of resources, so the intellectual infrastructure calcifies if 
regulation constricts the inflow, or dissemination, of information.  If copyright 
protects the production of information, such as compilations that merger doctrine 
might characterise as void of expression, then increasingly inflow of information that 
develops the intellectual infrastructure will shrink.   
 
According to US theorists, copyright law should dynamically transfer proprietary data 
items to the intellectual infrastructure as they ‘become stock and standard’ – in other 
words, as soon as they can no longer be said to manifest a unique expressive 
character.
40
  Merger doctrine prevents private enclosure of publicly useful 
information: ‘[u]underpinning the idea-expression dichotomy, as well as the merger 
doctrine, is the objective of keeping productivity-enabling ideas in the public 
domain.’
41
 
 
A concept inimical to the intellectual infrastructure is the idea that all copyright uses 
are remunerable.  Lawmakers usually take for granted that outside the exceptions 
stated in legislation, use of copyright material demands compensation.  We have 
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argued in another article that the logic of the statutory exceptions is not confined by 
statute, and permits gratuitous use of copyright material if the use does not offend the 
Berne three-step test.
42
  The user-pays principle, if applied wholesale to the use of 
copyright material, prevents knowledge flowing to the intellectual infrastructure.  If 
lawmakers protect the production of information, rather than encouraging its 
dissemination, they create the conditions for access to elementary knowledge to 
become conditional upon payment. 
 
Constitutional and purpose considerations 
 
In the United States, scholars and courts have, over time, asserted that the 
Constitution intends copyright laws to facilitate free speech,
43
 to ‘be the engine of free 
expression,’
44
 and to encourage (via incentive)
45
 dissemination of information.
46
  
Copyright should not impose ‘improper restraints’ on free expression.
47
  The ‘ultimate 
aim’ of copyright law is to encourage production of useful works ‘for the general 
public good.’
48
  The Supreme Court has, however, ruled that free speech is protected 
by the maxim that copyright protects expression not ideas – according to this 
reasoning, copyright intrinsically safeguards free speech.
49
     
 
In Australia, consideration of copyright purpose in light of constitutional objects is 
much more unlikely:
50
 the Australian Constitution, unlike its US counterpart, is not 
                                                 
42
 BF Fitzgerald and BA Atkinson Third Party Copyright and Public Information 
Infrastructure/Registries: How much copyright tax must the public pay? in Fitzgerald B and Perry M, 
eds, Knowledge Policy for the 21
st
 Century (forthcoming 2008) Irwin Law. 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00013627/ 
43
 See Hannibal Travis Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First 
Amendment 2000 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1-65 and Lyman Ray Patterson ‘Free Speech, 
Copyright and Fair Use’ and Copyright in Historical Perspective, supra.  Travis and Patterson discuss 
how judges in the nineteenth century were called upon to consider the relevance to copyright law-
making of Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution – which grants Congress power to ‘make 
laws to ‘promote the Progress of Sciences and the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries’ – and the First 
Amendment, which guarantees freedom of speech and the press.  Both concluded that while Art I 8(8) 
and the First Amendment read together invite a narrow reading of copyright scope, the judiciary 
gradually narrowed the field of permissible copyright uses.  According to Patterson, the fair use 
doctrine, codified in 1909 in the US Copyright Act, ‘brought consumer conduct within the realm of 
infringement’ and began ‘a termitic infestation of the constitutional right of free speech.’ 
44
 Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises 471 US 539 1985: ‘… it should not be forgotten that the 
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.  By establishing a marketable 
right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.’ 
45
 See preceding quote and Mazer v Stein 347 US 201, 209 (1954): ‘The economic philosophy behind 
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors in “science and the useful Arts.”’ 
46
 Harper v Row supra 471, quoting Second Circuit decision (citation omitted): ‘The public interest in 
the free flow of information is assured by the law’s refusal to recognise a valid copyright in facts.’ 
47
 Estate of Hemingway v Random House Inc 23 NY 2d 341, 348 1968: ‘The essential thrust of the First 
Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression ideas’. 
48
 Twentieth Century Music Corp v Aiken 422 US 156: ‘The immediate effect of our copyright law is to 
secure a fair return for an “author’s” creative labor  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to 
stimulate [production] for the general public good.’ 
49
 Harper & Row supra and see also Eldred v Aschcroft 239 F 3d (ultimately 537 US 186). 
50
 Brian F Fitzgerald Digital Property: the Ultimate Boundary? 2001 Roger Williams University Law 
Journal 9. <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00007406> 
usually regarded by lawyers as an oracular document.  However, ‘the existence of 
competing constitutional objectives [in relation to regulation of intellectual property], 
express and implied, is undoubted.’
51
  Scholars surveying the US scene have argued 
that anti-trust law, with its prohibition on monopoly created by anti-competitive 
conduct, provides judges with the tools to give effect to the intent of the constitutional 
copyright power and the First Amendment.
52
   
 
That intent is that copyright law encourage information dissemination, a goal 
consistent with that of competition policy.  Whether competition is understood to 
create market diversity or market efficiency, it is seen to result in consumer (user) 
choice.
53
  Choice is impossible without dissemination.  Laws that restrict access to 
information constrict choice and the way to prise open clamps on access is to 
understand the competitive (or anti-competitive) purpose for which access to 
information is granted or denied.  
 
This approach does not undermine the doctrinal approach usually adopted by the 
judiciary.  It does, however, refine that approach by supplying analytic tools that cut 
to the heart of questions of access.  As discussed, in the Nine v Ice appeal, the Full 
Federal Court seemed unable to conceive that substantiality should not determined by 
reference to the particular commercial interest of Nine
54
 rather than the purpose for 
which the copyright subsists.  That purpose is to enable Nine to disseminate 
programming information to the public safeguarded from information pirates.  
Infringement thus becomes an act of piracy – one that cannot take place unless Nine 
and the alleged infringer compete in a market. 
 
The European Union has dealt partially with the question of information compilation 
by issuing a directive on sui generis database protection.
55
  Legislation implementing 
the directive protects database compilers from unauthorised use and makes 
investment, rather than expressive originality, a condition for protection.  The EU did, 
however, to some extent resolve interpretive difficulties by beginning its directive 
with a preamble of 60 articles.  These make explicit the intent of the directive is to 
protect the investment of the compiler and to ensure consistency of law to facilitate 
the functioning of an internal market.  The preamble also declares that the purpose of 
the directive is pro-competitive.
56
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A year before the directive passed, the European Court of Justice ruled that 
broadcasters who prevented (by refusing to license) the respondent from publishing a 
weekly television guide containing their program schedules, engaged in anti-
competitive behaviour (abused their dominant market position).
57
  The Court found 
that the appellants’ actions were anti-competitive (frustrated the creation of a market 
to satisfy consumer demand for weekly guides); were not expressions of legitimate 
competition (there was ‘no justification’ for prohibition) and were unfair (the 
appellants abused their market power by excluding a competitor from the secondary 
market for supply of television guides).  The ECJ’s analysis, on competition policy 
grounds, thus had the effect of encouraging dissemination since it prevented copyright 
holders from withholding consumer information. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ice TV v Nine Network is a seminal copyright case because of its potential to restrict 
information flow.  Access to information is a human right,
58
 and while it might be 
thought that the public is not much harmed if prevented from extracting data from 
unexpressive information compilations, over time the oppressive exercise of 
proprietary rights in information could radically undermine our freedom to inform 
ourselves without cost or restriction. 
 
We have not written this article as advocates, however.  We have no wish to persuade 
by partial argument.  It seemed clear to us that the Full Court’s judgment failed to 
apply doctrine consistent with unmistakable policy principles.  For that reason, 
analysing the judgment involved an objective exercise in identifying logical 
deficiencies in the court’s reasoning, and analysing infringement in accord with 
related principles of law and policy.  
 
We believe, as we explained, that the court erred because it failed to separate the 
interest of the copyright holder, the Nine Network, and the copyright held by Nine.  
The copyright protects Nine against unfair competition (free riding for competitive 
advantage) in order to encourage Nine to continue production (dissemination).  The 
proper focus of analysis is the copyright held by Nine: if the copyright is intended 
secure the goal of dissemination by preventing unfair competition, analysis must 
discover the relevant market and whether Ice and Nine compete in that market.   
 
Competition principles supply tools of analysis.  It is important to reaffirm that we 
propose analysis of competitive conduct within a market as the most precise way to 
determine substantial reproduction.  Such analysis would tell us whether – in the 
present case – Ice’s copying is done for the purpose of using, without consent, and for 
competitive advantage, Nine’s investment and whether the effect of appropriation will 
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affect Nine’s production.  It short, it enables us to determine precisely the effect of 
reproduction on the interest affected. 
 
As we discussed in the second part of this article, the overriding consideration that 
should inform any assessment of compilation copyright is the policy for allowing 
copyright to subsist in compilations of information.  The reason for subsistence is not 
protection of the copyright owner, which is a necessary part of achieving the policy 
goal, but dissemination of information, a public good.  Copyright allows the owner to 
restrict the flow of information, and for that reason courts, in resolving questions 
about subsistence and substantiality, need to pay heed  to considerations of purpose: 
for what purpose does copyright subsist? for what purpose does the alleged infringer 
appropriate? Does the alleged infringement frustrate the purpose of the copyright?  
 
Responding to these questions will usually elucidate whether the parties compete in a 
market and the alleged infringement constitutes unfair competition.  It is lamentable 
that the Full Court, having decided that infringement occurred if appropriation harmed 
the fruit of Nine’s investment, failed to consider the precise nature of the harm to 
Nine.  Market analysis of the type we advocate would have revealed that the judge at 
first instance correctly determined that Nine and Ice were not competitors,
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 and that 
Ice’s copying of program information had no effect on Nine’s continued supply of 
information to aggregators.   
 
Ice’s publication of its electronic guides has no noticeable effect on the aggregators’ 
demand for supply of the weekly schedules and certainly does not affect Nine’s 
production of the weekly schedules.  In short, the electronic guide appears to have nil 
effect on Nine’s willingness to continue supply of programming information to the 
public.  Why then does Nine wish to restrain Ice? To a certain extent, the question is 
academic, if the court is satisfied that that Ice did not take compiled information – the 
fruit of Nine’s investment - in order to secure advantage, to Nine’s detriment, in a 
competitive market.   
 
At the same time, consideration of why Nine seeks restraint results in a likely answer 
suggesting itself.  Ice’s television guide facilitates recording of free-to-air programs 
by viewers, and the widespread practice of recording programs potentially harms 
advertising revenue, the lifeblood of commercial television stations.  Non-publication 
of Nine’s programming information in Ice’s electronic television guide, which greatly 
reduces the utility of the guide to viewers, may help to protect the Nine Network 
against the loss of advertising revenues, since the viewer cannot refer to the Ice 
program guide in making recording decisions.   
 
Assuming this reasoning to be correct, the ulterior purpose of Nine’s attempted 
restraint of Ice underlines the critical importance of courts undertaking the task that 
the Full Court neglected: to define, in the most precise terms possible, the actual harm 
caused by an alleged substantial reproduction of copyright compilations.  
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